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2EQIP has an authorized budget of $1.3 billion over the seven year period ending in 2002, with
annual amounts of $200 million per year and the lead agency is the Natural Resources Conservation
Service (NRCS).  EQIP provides technical, financial, and educational assistance to farmers and ranchers to
prevent and control nonpoint pollution; one-half of the funds are directed toward livestock production and
the remainder to more general agricultural priorities.
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The Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP)
2 is the most current of a long list of
conservation programs stretching back to the 1930s.  Under the auspices of the 1996 Farm Bill, EQIP
replaced several older programs: The Agricultural Conservation Program (ACP), the Water Quality
Incentives Program, the Great Plains Conservation Program, and the Colorado River Basin Salinity
Control Program.  The ACP program had been the program that allocated USDA cost sharing funds at the
county level for soil erosion control, water quality protection practices, and forestry management.  It was
administered by the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service (ASCS), now referred to as the
Farm Service Agency (FSA).  The ACP has been criticized for its high costs, its inflexibility, its “top-
down” nature, as well as for not being targeted to achieve environmental outcomes.  EQIP was, at least in
part, a response to these criticisms--it is designed to be cost-effective, locally-driven, and targeted to agro-
environmental problems. 
In one sense, EQIP follows a long tradition.  The Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act of
1936 provided for payments to farmers for “soil building” and “soil conserving” practices and paid farmers
to shift lands away from “soil-depleting” to “soil-conserving” crops (Batie, 1985).  However, in another
sense, EQIP is a new generation of conservation programs which are designed to be more flexible and3This period of immense transition in conservation programs--as they began the difficult swing to
more environmental objectives--can actually be dated from the 1970s.  Starting in the 1970s, information
on agro-environmental problems became more readily available, thanks, in part, to the rise of
environmentalism and USDA’s response to environmentalist’s demands.  The National Resource Inventory
is one example of a new information base that was so persuasive that it swayed policymakers to move in
new directions.  Of course, such use of this information required excellent policy entrepreneurs.  (See
Porter 1998 for a good review of much of this period.)
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better targeted to environmental issues; EQIP can even be thought of as a “pilot” green payments program. 
That is, EQIP is a green payments program designed to pay farmers to “produce” environmental outcomes.
EQIP as a Traditional Program
First, consider EQIP as a traditional conservation program.  Conservation programs have always
been designed to add to farmer income; indeed, the original 1936 Act was a constitutional way to support
farm income and provide supply control--because “soil-depleting” crops were defined to be those crops in
surplus (Batie, 1985).  The political objective of farm income support has been embedded within all
conservation programs since 1936 (Batie and Kramer, 1985). 
However, starting with the 1985 Farm Bill and its conservation programs of The Conservation
Reserve Program, Swampbuster, and Sodbuster, farm income support program objectives have
increasingly, but begrudgingly, given ground to environmental protection objectives (Batie, Shabman, and
Kramer, 1986; Kramer and Batie, 1985).
3  Not only were environmental programs added, traditional
commodity programs were remodeled to require “cross compliance,” that is, farmers had to show evidence
of “good conservation behavior” before having access to other program benefits (Kramer and Batie, 1985).
The Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), is an example of the evolutionary changes that
occurred.  CRP has served the twin goals of farm income support and environmental protection since 1985,
but has, over time, been fine-tuned to better meet environmental targets.  Initially focused on soil erosion, it
changed with the 1990 Farm Bill to give more consideration to water quality concerns.  An Environmental
Benefits Index was used to prioritize contract offers (Batie, Schulz and Schweikhardt, 1997).  Most3
recently, farmers can add parts of fields into the Conservation Reserve Program as buffer or filter strips
rather than whole fields, gaining more environmental protection for each CRP dollar spent (Batie, Schulz,
and Schweikhardt, 1997).
It is not difficult, therefore, to perceive EQIP as the next step in the tradition of adding programs
and program elements to better protect the environment.  Indeed, EQIP, by not requiring land retirement to
obtain program benefits, complements the CRP program which does require such retirement.
EQIP as a New Generation Program
There is another way to view EQIP--not as a traditional conservation program, but as a new
generation program which reflects the needs of the new global economy.  Thus, we find that, historically,
farm income support goals have been tempered not only by environmental objectives but also by budgetary
constraints, by loss of rural political power, and by the need to maintain global competitiveness.  As Potter
(1998) notes with reference to both the U.S. and European agricultural policy reform:
The budgetary crises of the mid-1980s were absolutely critical in changing the dynamic of
the debate about agricultural policy reform.  Without this spark, it is unlikely that the
greening of farm policy would have ignited when it did (though agri-environmental policies
would have emerged eventually). (p. 128)
It is the policy objective of global competitiveness that promises to make EQIP standout as
something other than the next step in a long tradition of conservation programs.  In pursuit of global
markets, the United States had pledged itself in trade agreements--particularly the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT)--to liberalize trade and to remove subsidies to farmers which are coupled to
farm production.  This liberalization trend was one of the motivations for the decoupling of the farm
program payments from production that occurred in the 1996 Farm Bill.  Participating farmers now receive4Even coupled payments would be “GATT-legal” at this time because the U.S. has already reduced
coupled payments below those required by the GATT.  However, it is realistic to assume that there will be,
in time, trade agreement pressures to reduce coupled payments to farmers to zero.  If that occurred,
countries wishing to subsidize farmers would need to use direct payments to be “GATT-legal.”
5Many environmentalists appeared to recognize this significance of EQIP as the first green
program when they so fiercely debated the size of the livestock operations that would be eligible for EQIP. 
Many did not want to set the precedent that green payments would go to the larger scale, industrial
operations.
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farm income payments as direct payments, but these payments are not tied to the quantity of program crop
they produce.  Such direct payments are “GATT-legal.”
4
When direct payments are substituted for commodity program payments however, they are readily
perceived as welfare payments–transferring money from taxpayers to farmers.  Neither farmers nor
taxpayers are overly fond of such direct payments, and one might expect increasing political pressures to
justify why the farm sector should continue to receive public support (Potter, 1998).  Paying farmers to
produce desired environmental outcomes is far more politically palatable and defendable.  As Potter (1998)
noted with respect to agricultural policy reform:
The effect, arguably, was to make national policy makers much more receptive to the
dispositions of environmentalists....  Far from challenging their traditional policy
entitlements, arguments in favour of an expanded system of green payments offered the
farm lobby a means of defence, provided agri-environmental reform could be presented as
requiring a redirection rather than a net withdrawal of farm support (p. 128).
 Furthermore, such subsidies--or green payments--to farmers to maintain environmental amenities or to
reduce agro-environmental problems are also “GATT-legal.”  
Thus, EQIP, which is a decoupled payment for environmental protection, can be considered the
first green program of any significant magnitude in the U.S. that is not a land retirement program.
5  Since
EQIP can be viewed as our first serious green payment program, it is particularly worthy of careful
analysis.  At some future date, it maybe that both U.S. environmentalists and producers will be searching
for just such a well-designed green payment program.  Presumably in a free trade world, producers will see6The composite environmental index was comprised of 11 factors potential soil productivity loss,
sediment production, air quality, pesticide exposure, wildlife habitat improvement, nitrogen runoff, nitrate
leaching, filter strips, pesticide leaching, flood-peak reduction and endangered species habitat (Heimlich,
1994).
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an advantage to additional public payments--even if they are supporting environmental outcomes rather
than commodity production.  Environmentalists may turn to green payment programs as a politically
acceptable method of achieving agro-environmental objectives.
Some questions that appear to be policy-relevant with respect to green payment programs are:
(1) To what extent could (or should) green payments substitute for traditional commodity
payments?
(2) To what extent does EQIP reflect the characteristics of a well-designed GATT-legal green
payment program?
Green Payments vs. Commodity Payments
The answer to the first question, “To what extent could (or should) green payments substitute for
traditional commodity payments?” requires some assumptions as to objectives. 
If the agro-environmental objectives of public policy are to improve those agro-environmental
outcomes that are mostly related to water quality or which are closest to large populations, then there is a
“disconnect” between green payment programs and traditional farm income support programs.  In general,
the geographic areas in the U.S. which have the greater agro-environmental problems as measured by a
composite environmental index
6 which tends to emphasize water quality concerns, do not correspond well
to the historical distribution of government support payments (Lynch and Smith, 1994).  Much of the
historic farm program payments were concentrated in the Great Plains and the wheat growing areas of
eastern Washington and Oregon.  However, most of the agro-environmental problems as defined by the7In addition to Lynch and Smith (1994), see the NRCS site maps of the location of various agro-
environmental problems (based on 1992 Natural Resource Inventory data) at
http://www.nhq.nrcs.usda.gov/land/index/intro.html.
8See Ervin 1997 and Batie 1997 for a discussion of how agro-environmental problems will not be
resolved by agricultural policy reform by itself.
6
index, are concentrated in the water-rich eastern part of the United States.
7  Overlap between traditional
commodity program payments is limited and is concentrated mostly on acreage near the Mississippi River
(Lynch and Smith, 1994).  A conclusion stands out from these comparisons:  Green Payment Programs, if
targeted at water-related agro-environmental problems, will not substitute well for traditional income
support payments.
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On the other hand, if the agro-environmental objectives of concern are wind-blown dust and prairie
land habitat, there is a better match between traditional and green payments.  Wind-blown dust problems
are found in the northern and southern plains; the same areas also have received high total farm program
payments. Similar conclusions apply to the grassland bird habitat associated with the Great Plains and
Mississippi Watershed (National Audubon Society, 1995).
Of course, there is little reason to assume that green program payments should replace income
support payments, nor any reason to believe the public would demand such replacement.  There is every
reason, however, to believe that there will be political rent-seeking forces from affected farm interests to
preserve previous income entitlements.  Also, agencies also can improve their political environment and
assure their survival by spreading payments to many rather than target payments to a few (Skees, 1994). 
One way to restore income protection is to redistribute green payments toward the geographic patterns
associated with traditional commodity program payments (Potter, 1998), but such a redistribution comes at
the cost of reducing the cost-effectiveness of tax dollars spent for water-related environmental protection.
However, using green payments in lieu of traditional income support payments is difficult for at
least three reasons.  First, national level data is now available to identify when and where such a7
redistribution of green program payments would reduce overall environmental protection.  If little
environmental protection was the perceived outcome of a redistribution, environmental interest groups
would predictably direct the general public’s attention to this outcome.  Indeed, if a significant
redistribution of green payments to achieve income support goals occurs at the cost of neglecting important
agro-environmental problems, the political acceptability of such subsidies will most likely evaporate,
probably to be replaced with demands for regulation of farms to meet environmental goals.  
Second, redirecting green payments to be income support payments appears to violate the GATT
agreement which requires that green payments be part of clearly defined government environmental
programs, have no or minimal trade distorting effects, and be limited to subsidizing the added cost or lost
income from the practice adopted or technology shift accomplished (Potter, 1998).  And, while the U.S. is
currently in compliance with the GATT agreement, increased income support “disguised” as green support
payments could, if large enough, result in exceeding the GATT guidelines for such support payments.  
And, third, such redirection could put a strain on federal budgets, since targeting programs to
carefully selected environmental problems should be more cost-effective and less expensive than broadly
distributing payments in lieu of traditional income support payments.
Thus, assuming that the agro-environmental problems of most interest are those captured in an
water-related environmental benefit index, the answer to the question of whether green payments could
substitute for commodity program payments appears to be: “not well.”  Furthermore, this discussion
suggests that as the fledgling EQIP program develops, we can expect to see it caught in a swirling set of
political forces...some pulling it to duplicate the old commodity program payment distributions, some to
target certain agro-environmental problems, some to target other agro-environmental problems, some to
target certain types or sizes of farms, some to spend money, and some to save money.  Also, there is and
will continue to be conflict as to who should be administering the program--Farm Service Agency, Natural
Resource Conservation Service, Extension, or consultants. 9Accountability includes assuring that programs are transparent in their objectives and operation,
evaluated as to their environmental outcomes, and monitored to assure compliance (OECD, 1997).
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EQIP as a Green Payment Program
EQIP, as currently designed, is not intended to replace traditional commodity program payments,
but rather is an environmental protection program.  Thus, the second question of “To what extent does
EQIP reflect the desired characteristics of a ‘GATT-legal’ green program payment?” is appropriate.  A
recent Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) publication (OECD, 1997)
listed three such characteristics: targeted, tailored and transparent.  That is, as a green payment program
having improved environmental outcomes as its ultimate goal, ideally one would want EQIP to be focused
in a cost-effective way on achieving important agro-environmental outcomes (i.e., be targeted); to be
designed to create effective positive incentives for landowners to take actions that will create these
outcomes (i.e., be tailored); and to have accountability
9 (i.e., be transparent).
The EQIP legislation as written by Congress encompasses most of these objectives.  The general
goal of EQIP is to “reconcile productivity and profitability with protection and enhancement of the
environment” (16 USCA 3830(2)(B)(ii)(West Supp. 1998)) and “to maximize the benefits per [program]
dollar expended” (16 USCA 3830(c)(3)(B)(West Supp. 1998)).  There are multiple ways to read such
legislation, but one way--arguably, the most accurate way--is certainly consistent with a well-designed,
targeted, tailored, transparent green payment program.  
Assuming that a well-designed green program was the legislative intent there is, nevertheless, a
long road from legislative intent to successful implementation.  The political forces to pursue objectives
other than environmental improvement; rent-seeking by various private and agency interests; lack of
science-based data; administrative problems of communication and coordination; lack of resources; agency
and farmer inertia; and program complexity can all interact and result in inadequate incentives for EQIP to9
reach its purported goal.  While EQIP is a young, emerging program, preliminary evidence suggests that
numerous implementation hurdles remain.
The analysis that follows examines these hurdles, mostly in the context of the Michigan EQIP
program.  It is my opinion that, in Michigan, most agency personnel in charge of implementing the program
are seriously endeavoring to do an excellent job, faithful to the administrative intent of the law.  Yet the
hurdles associated with targeting, tailoring, and achieving transparency are high.  Should the U.S. design
and implement larger and more comprehensive green payment programs, understanding the nature of these
hurdles and Michigan’s responses to them foreshadows potential future problems. 
Targeting: The Devil Is in the Details.  The first criterion of a well-designed program is
targeting.  Here the issue is whether those farmers who receive EQIP funds are farming the land which is
significantly contributing to priority agro-environmental problems.  While the EQIP legislation laid out
general principles, the rule making for EQIP implementation added the details that are crucial in
determining the actual impact of EQIP.  Implementation details–such as the allocation formula, the short
time for implementation, pressures to spend the funds, agency inertia, and interagency coordination–all
have made targeting difficult.  
The Allocation Formula.  While the general legislation allocated funds for the program, the rule-
making process developed the allocation formula that determined how much each state would receive in
EQIP funds.  It was also a means to deliver the message that EQIP was different than ACP.  
The development of the allocation formula however, was constrained by the requirement that half
of EQIP funds must go to livestock concerns, that no less than 65 percent of the funds in any state could be
allocated to priority areas, that tribal areas would have higher priority, and that limits were set on the
dollars per participant.  Such constraints are typical of those imposed by Congress interested in spreading
benefits more evenly across Congressional Districts (Wu and Boggess, 1998).  10
The formula was designed around an environmental benefit index oriented to water quality
problems, so that states with significant water quality agro-environmental problems would get the larger
share of the funds.  However, strictly following the formula would have meant massive redistribution of
funds away from those states with historically high ACP payments toward those states that had historically
received much smaller funding amounts.  Thus, the allocation application was altered so that states would
not be overwhelmed by large non-incremental changes from historic funding and agency staffing levels. 
The reason behind this rule-making may have been fear of inadequate institutional capacity at the state and
local level (Doering, 1998).  Large (small) influxes of funds into states with small (large) programs and
agency staff might be problematic.  Another possible reason may have been political, that is, massive
redistributions of funds may have been politically unacceptable.
Once the formula allocations were altered so as to make the program less of a radical change from
previous programs, future allocations of a more radical nature were compromised, due to the existence of
new multi-year contractual obligations.  That is, during EQIP’s first year, many multi-year contracts were
signed, creating a continued obligation for funds into states regardless of their re-ranking on the allocation
formula in future years. 
Speed of Implementation.  Also, in the first year, the speed of implementation was, from the states’
point of view, quite challenging.  EQIP was law on April 4, 1996 but the implementation rules were not
available to the states until May 22, 1997 due to numerous design delays and disagreements between
USDA and the Office of Management and Budget.  Yet EQIP started in fiscal year 1996.  States had little
time to understand the program, to personalize the program to their state, to gain final acceptance from
headquarters, and to implement the program.
In most states, there was also no time to have a truly locally-driven process, at least in the first
year.  In Michigan the implementation rules contain a process whereby Local Conservation Districts using
local work groups propose Conservation Priority Areas (CPA’s).  For the first year, CPA’s were largely11
identified and designed from the state NRCS staff level since the late publication of the rules did not allow
sufficient time for Local Conservation Districts to take the necessary action.  In addition, there was
inadequate time to let farmers know of the program and encourage their participation--a task made even
more difficult by the complexity of the program.
Also, there were challenges associated with changing agency roles and identities.  In particular,
NRCS became the lead agency usurping the role previously held by FSA.  The change of roles lead to some
frictions that were confounded by the requirement that FSA was responsible for disbursing the funds.  The
need for concurrence of NRCS to spend money, in many cases, slowed the process and increased tensions. 
In addition, new agency roles and identities lead to some confusion for the farm community as to which
agency was truly in charge.
Pressure to Spend Funds.  There was significant pressure to be certain that the EQIP funds were
spent, since EQIP is a multi-year program and failure to spend funds can be interpreted as reason to reduce
future years’ funding.  Also, any EQIP funds in any year not allocated by September 30
th are no longer
available.  
This pressure to allocate all the funds available is typical of all agencies with grant-giving
responsibilities.  As Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) note in general:
“Whether it has a lot to give or just a little, the granting organization must get rid of what
it has.  It is a mover of money.  Its task is to remove a certain amount of money from its
coffers in the time period allotted.... An important internal goal for any organization is the
rationalization of its work schedule.  It must secure for itself a stable flow of business so
that it can allocate its time and resources” (p. 137).
As Libby (1998) has noted, these pressures and constraints assure that the objective of obtaining the
“maximum benefits per program dollar spent” will be compromised.
Agency Inertia.  The difficulties of timing and funding constraints provided an additional
motivation for states--particularly those already so inclined--to make the new EQIP look like the old ACP. 
Limiting change meant limiting the transaction costs as well as political fallout from non-incremental12
changes.  Although the NRCS headquarters refused to accept state programs that were “business-as-
usual,” the inertia in the program implementation was none-the-less quite real.  It is a yet to be resolved
empirical question as to whether the distribution of historical ACP payments are significantly different
from the new EQIP payments, but the political and pragmatic pressures remain for broadly defining EQIP
eligibility.
Targeting--It Is Not Easy To Be Green
Additional targeting difficulties stemmed from the complexity of the program design, the locally-
driven process, and information gaps.
Program Complexity.  There are also targeting difficulties posed by the complexity of the EQIP
program (Batie, Schulz, and Schweikhardt, 1998).  In Michigan, for example, implementation of EQIP is
guided, in part, by the State Technical Committee which reviews proposals for identifying and funding
priority areas addressing environmental problems, and it makes recommendations to the NRCS State
Conservationist as to which proposals should be approved.  Several criteria are used to select the priority
areas: the significance of the agro-environmental problems, expected producer participation, estimated
program cost, and whether other financial and technical assistance is available.  If a proposal is selected, a
Conservation Priority Area (CPA) is created.  Currently, Michigan has fourteen of these CPA’s.
However, farmers who have significant problems, but are not in the priority areas are also eligible
for funds.  Funds are available for Statewide Priority Resource Concerns (SPRC).  Michigan currently has
six priority resource concerns listed--such as riparian corridor management systems, groundwater resource
protection systems, or animal production management systems.  In Michigan, in 1997, 25 percent of the
206 EQIP contracts and 30 percent of the EQIP funds were in Statewide Priority Resource Concerns
(Batie, Schulz, and Schweikhardt, 1998).
The complexity of determining eligibility for EQIP from a farmer viewpoint is reflected in Figure
1, where a farmer must determine whether he or she is in a CPA or eligible for SPRC funds, or ineligible. 10Conservation Districts are the most obvious way from the standpoint of “capacity” to get a
“locally-led” process.  (It was also the method intended by the legislation.)  In Michigan, unlike states such
as Maryland or Virginia, has only farmers on its boards. These farmer-comprised boards will most likely
reflect a prioritization of problems based on producer perceptions more than, say, those of recreationalists
or other water users.  But right now Conservation Districts appear to be the only existing locally-driven
institutions for program implementation.
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In a water abundant state like Michigan, EQIP contracts in CPAs and in SPRCs are probably assisting
farmers to pursue worthwhile environmental goals.  However, the dual targeting of both regions and
problems, underlain with imperfect local data on environmental problems, would appear to leave few
Michigan farmers ineligible for EQIP funds.
The program complexity also posed hurdles for state program design.  For example, in Michigan,
the required offer index (bidding competition) was omitted.  The State Technical Committee and NRCS in
Michigan was concerned that the proposed competitive bidding by farmers--essentially indicating what the
farmer would pay above the minimum required to protect the environment --would lead to bidding
competition with contracts being awarded to more wealthy farmers at the expense of poorer ones.  The
Michigan State Technical Committee and NRCS saw no obvious way of addressing these issues, and
ultimately omitted the offer bidding from the Michigan program.  The Michigan program was approved by
NRCS headquarters without the offer index.
Locally-driven Process.  In Michigan, as with many states, the local Conservation Districts play a
crucial role in the successful functioning of EQIP, because EQIP is based on locally determined
conservation needs.  Local Conservation Districts have the responsibility to establish local work groups to
determine the most significant natural resource needs of the community.  The local work group then
quantifies the natural resource needs and obtains funding to resolve the environmental problems.  One
source of funding is the identification of a conservation priority area eligible for EQIP funds.
There are targeting difficulties built-in to this locally-driven process where local work groups
convened by Local Conservation Districts
10 determine top priority environmental needs (generally county-14
based).  While the State Technical Committee is a filter to assure a state-level priority perspective is
adhered to, they still must respond to the proposals of local work groups.  There is little guarantee that
responding to local priorities will translate into the targets that would have been identified by a broader
state-level or regional-level identification process.
Too often local Conservation Districts lack the institutional capacity and resources to get the job
done.  Indeed, in many situations, they may not even “buy into” the vision of EQIP as a green payment
program.  In Michigan, the local districts are directed by an unpaid elected board who can easily view
EQIP as an “unfunded mandate,” rather than an opportunity to achieve local conservation and
environmental goals.
Also, in Michigan, the CPA’s are re-examined yearly.  In Michigan in 1997 and 1998 the same
CPSA were selected but three new ones were added in 1998.  While the transaction costs of yearly
adjustments may be high, yearly adjustments can allow for fine-tuning the program to achieve more
environmental improvement.  However, adding CPAS or changing boundaries also translates into more
farmers having access to EQIP funds and multi-year contracts, and brings into question whether the EQIP
program is adequately targeted to truly priority agro-environmental problems.
Information Gaps.  Because the science that links farming practices with environmental outcomes
is fragmentary and incomplete, targeting is not based on actual environmental monitoring and
improvements.  Rather, farmers are paid for certain management and conservation practices such as
vegetative barriers, grade stabilization structures, conservation cropping rotations, pest management and
the like that are designed to minimize delivery of identified pollutants and that are assumed therefore to
relate to environmental outcomes.  It will take much more research to determine if this type of targeting is
effective at maximizing the economic returns to pollution reduction. 
Also, because of information gaps, it is difficult to assure that the funds only go to practices that
“would not otherwise be initiated without government assistance as required by GATT.”    Still, many15
would argue that EQIP is “greener” than a program based on the bushels produced of an agricultural
commodity or the previous ACP program.  Whether one thinks EQIP is a targeted green payment program
may depend on what alternative program is used for comparison.
Tailoring--Pushing on a Kite
The second criterion of interest in a green payment program is “tailoring.”  Here the issue is
whether the technical assistance advice and choice of practices funded by EQIP is tailored to the farmers’
needs to assure the desired environmental outcome.  The Farm Service Agency (FSA) determines which
farmers are eligible to apply for EQIP funds, but the NRCS is responsible for approval of all conservation
plans, including those prepared by non-NRCS conservation consultants.  In Michigan, applications are
ranked according to ranking criteria specific to environmental problems relative to other applications. 
Applications are reviewed, with the highest ranking selected and recommended for approval for an EQIP
contract.  The Farm Service Agency County Committee has the authority to give final approval for an
EQIP contract.  Unsuccessful applications are deferred and remain on the ranking register until they are
approved, until their application is withdrawn, or until the available funds are depleted at the end of the
fiscal year (Batie, Schulz, and Schweikhardt, 1998).
One difference between EQIP’s and ACP’s application process is the new role of NRCS in ranking
applications relative to their potential impact on environmental problems.  However, like ACP, EQIP has
few mechanisms and minimal budget to reach those farmers who should be adopting environmentally
protecting practices if environmental goals are to be achieved.  Rather, the NRCS and FSA react to the
farmers who identify themselves and apply for funds.
There is definitive research to suggest that the approach of taking applications from whoever walks
in the agency door will miss many farmers whose farms are important contributors to local agro-
environmental problems (Batie, 1994).  Farmers may not know that EQIP exists, they may believe
themselves ineligible, they may believe they do not have an agro-environmental problem associated with16
their farm, they may wish to avoid the costs of meeting the eligibility criteria, they may not want to be
judged by the local FSA County Committee, they may not believe the preventive actions embedded in EQIP
are worth the funds, or they may not participate for many other reasons (OTA, 1990).
While EQIP education assistance funds were used to inform a broad range of farmers about the
program, EQIP is not well-designed nor funded to adequately address the need for active outreach to
priority farmers.  EQIP did not fund overhead for technical assistance, forcing the NRCS to do “more with
less.”  Some states’ NRCS may be able to steal from other budgets and adequately handle the applications
that are approved, or get more assistance from the extension service, but a more proactive stance is
probably asking more than most NRCS offices can deliver by themselves.
Even the existing procedure does not suggest much selectivity. Monthly selections of the top of the
ranking register of applications raises the possibility that if an applicant waits long enough, his or her
application will be selected.  From an agency point of view, however, it makes sense to keep selecting
applicants on the basis of the best first until all the money is allocated.
Tailoring--Whose Job Is This Anyway?
EQIP has the potential to meet new environmental objectives, in part because it encouraged new
roles and new partners.  But change can be met with inertia and dissipate energies.  FSA administered
ACP, but now the administration of EQIP is headquartered with the NRCS–a reallocation of
responsibilities that was quite contentious.  And, for some, the new roles are difficult.  One Michigan
NRCS official, for example, referred with discomfort to the new NRCS role of administering the ranking
criteria and managing land eligibility: “We are a state technical assistance agency, not a lottery.”
It is also a challenge for an agency such as NRCS with its long history of conserving soil and
protecting the environment throughout the nation to implement, evaluate, and enforce a targeted
environmental program such as EQIP.  It is even more challenging to do so in a time of downsizing and17
limited resources.  EQIP is not the only program for which NRCS and FSA are responsible, they must
allocate their time and staff across many competing obligations.
There are also relatively new partnership roles with EQIP–such as the addition of environmental
NGO (Non-governmental Organizations) representatives to the State Technical Committee.  New roles and
new partners, mean higher transaction costs and more need for coordination.  But telling agencies and
NGO’s to cooperate does not provide them a road map with how to get the job done.  And many of these
partners--FSA, NRCS, Extension, environmental NGO’s, have a long, long history of conflict--at least at
the federal level--making coordination both difficult and problematic.  It may well be that building
coordination of this nature into EQIP could be just as easily translate into the building of antagonistic
administrative relationships.  The truth of this statement will no doubt differ in different states and
localities, but is a real possibility none-the-less.
While new roles and partnerships are both laudable and necessary, EQIP provides little guidance
or resources to lower the transaction costs, to improve institutional capacities, or to defuse past animosities. 
If these constraints are large, fine-tuned tailoring is problematic at best.
Transparency: Which Direction Is Forward?
The final of the three criterion--of targeted, tailored and transparent--for a well-designed green
program payment is most difficult.  How does one evaluate and hold accountable a program such as EQIP? 
Ideally, the measure should be improved environmental outcomes, but, with rare exception, there is little or
no baseline data nor monitoring from which to begin an evaluation.  The science that links farming
practices to water and air quality outcomes is fragmentary.  Often long time lags occur between the
changes on the farm and environmental improvements.  Or environmental improvements are swamped by
increased pollution from non-farm sources.  In most states, there are no performance standards to act as
quantified environmental quality objectives.  18
So, given the above, should EQIP’s success be measured by the numbers of farmers who have
successful applications, the smooth functioning of the EQIP process, the number and types of practices
applied, the number of conservation priority areas, the number of acres receiving EQIP funds, the number
of dollars allocated, the number of farmers who are aware of the program, state EQIP budget growth
overtime, or some other criteria?  Perhaps the measure of success should be based on correlations of the
distribution of EQIP funds with the traditional distribution of ACP funds or with known environmental
problems?
Until such time that performance standards and monitoring become more commonplace, true
accountability of the program in the broadest sense will be elusive.
Actual vs. Ideal: An Unfair Comparison
EQIP is far short of perfect marks on the green program criteria of targeting, tailoring, and
transparency.  This statement is true even in a state such as Michigan where considerable effort has been
put forth in good faith by agency personnel to get the program “on the ground” and to make a difference. 
But as I warn my classes, it is unfair to compare actual programs with ideal criteria.  In a fair comparison,
an analyst should only compare actual (ideal) program functioning with other actual (ideal) alternatives. 
We should not be surprised, given what we know about political economy and the history of agricultural,
conservation, and environmental programs that a new concept program such as EQIP has some flaws.  Nor
should we be surprised that EQIP implementation is somewhat divorced from policy intentions.  Indeed, as
Pressman and Wildavsky conclude:
Our normal expectation should be that new programs will fail to get off the ground and
that, at best, they will take considerable time to get started.  The cards in this world are
stacked against things happening as so much effort is required to make them move.  The
remarkable thing is that new programs work at all. (p. 109)
EQIP has “good intentions” to be a green payment program embedded in policy, but, to-date, the
implementation process appears to have left a gap between promise and program performance.  The19
reasons are, however, predictable and understandable.  And, the program is still very young and evolving. 
Many participants are just beginning to understand EQIP’s intent as part of a larger context.  It may be
way to early to judge its success.  To quote Pressman and Wildavsky again:
If we thought from the beginning that they [the programs] were unlikely to be successful,
their failure to achieve state goals or to work at all would not cry out for any special
explanation.  If we believed that intense conflicts of interests were involved, if people who
had to cooperate were expected to be at loggerheads, if necessary resources were far
beyond those available, we might wonder rather more why the programs were attempted
instead of expressing amazement at their shortcomings. (p. 87)
The Future of Green Program Payments
Still, the future of green program payments appears to be quite important.  If nations continue
toward more trade liberalization, green program payments may be one of only a few politically acceptable,
politically stable, “GATT-legal” forms of government support for agriculture (Potter, p. 162).  When this
Farm Bill ends in 2002, there will be considerable debate on the next steps.  Environmentalists and
conservationists should be prepared with good arguments to obtain a share of those funds “to reconcile
farming profitability with enhancement of the environment.”
Furthermore, and significantly, the demand for improved agro-environmental performance appears
to be accelerating.  It may well be that unless such improvement is forthcoming, regulations will be
imposed on agriculture to meet new environmental standards.  Green payments could be used to mute those
demands by achieving improvements voluntarily, or to offset the costs of meeting new regulations. 
However, the gap between the promise of a green payment program such as EQIP and the
performance of the program will need to close for these events to occur.  If EQIP, despite good intentions,
fails to improve environmental outcomes, then it can neither mute demands for regulation nor offset
regulatory costs.  EQIP needs to be further refined to be better targeted, tailored and transparent if it is to
meet its potential as a green payment program.  20
Furthermore, the program is presently quite modestly funded at $200 million per year as compared
to historic income support payments of $7 to 12 billion per year.  If it is truly to make an impact on either
farm income or environmental goals, EQIP must also be better funded.  Until such time that better funding
and improved implementation is a reality EQIP can, in reality, be considered only a fledgling “pilot
program” of a possible new generation of environmental programs.21
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